This paper investigates the relationship between capital account openness and inflation since the 1980s. It argues that widespread capital account liberalization during the last two decades appears to have contributed to the worldwide disinflation observed during the same period. The paper builds a theoretical model to motivate the presence of a negative link between financial integration and inflation. It tests the prediction of the theoretical model by employing static and dynamic panel data procedures. Financial integration appears to discipline monetary authorities, or to help them convince the private sector that they will be more disciplined in the future.
Introduction
Over the last two decades, a large number of developed and developing countries have become more open and integrated with the rest of the world. Both the volume and nature of international capital flow have radically altered during this period. In the 1970s, international borrowing and lending was primarily made up of foreign aid or official finance for developing countries. However, with the liberalization of capital and investment controls during the 1980s and 1990s, the vast majority of international capital now comes from private investors, through capital markets (such as sales of bonds and equities) and international investment by multinational companies.
During the early 1990s, there was a growing belief that relaxing restraints on movement of capital would yield benefits similar to liberalized trade. It was strongly believed that free movement of capital can have several important benefits for the domestic economy. It led to overall improved international allocative efficiency. In particular, it created opportunities for portfolio diversification, consumption smoothing, risk sharing and 472 A. Sen Gupta intertemporal trade. By holding claims on foreign countries, agents could protect themselves against adverse shocks affecting home country alone. Thus, increased capital mobility raised the risk adjusted rates of return, which in turn could encourage higher savings and investment, leading to faster rates of growth.
An open capital account also induced policymakers to undertake and adhere to good policies. Opening up of the capital account can have an impact on number of government policies. As pointed out by Tytell and Wei (2004) these include national competition policy, regulatory rules on private listed companies, regulation of banks, equity and labour markets and finally, monetary and fiscal policy. With financial globalization, the threat of capital outflow, in the face of opportunistic policies, acts as a 'discipline effect' for the policymaker.
However, a spate of financial crises in the 1990s forced policymakers to rethink the strategy of unbridled capital flows. The countries that were worst affected by these crises were the ones that had opened up capital inflows. As a result, several economists have pointed out that unrestrained capital flows can act as a serious impediment to global financial stability and have called for the imposition of capital controls, such as the Tobin Tax, on trade in international assets.
In recent years, several economists have pointed out that it is highly likely that the major benefits of successful financial liberalization are primarily indirect. Successful financial liberalization can act as a catalyst for growth by imposing discipline on macroeconomic policies, promoting development of the financial sector and exposing domestic firms to competition from foreign competitors. Thus, freer movement of capital flows tends to generate a number of, what Kose et al. (2006) term as, 'potential collateral benefits' of financial integration.
In this paper, we look at the validity of the one such benefit. In particular, we focus on how opening up the capital account has affected inflation across a wide range of countries. In the past two decades, the world observed two distinct international economic trends. First, there was global disinflation, with inflation rates falling on average even in countries that had a history of high inflation, such as some Latin American countries. Secondly, several countries liberalized their capital account, despite warnings of the risks of currency and banking crises. In this paper, we investigate whether these two events were related? The paper develops an illustrative model, which predicts that opening up of the capital account significantly lowers the policymaker's incentive to generate an inflationary shock. The paper provides theoretical and empirical evidence for a strong negative relationship between capital account openness and inflation. It goes on to argue that opening up the capital account disciplines the monetary authorities as it raises the penalties for loose monetary policy. By opening up the capital account, the policymaker also imparts a signal to the private sector that it is willing to suffer the punishment of loose monetary policy in the form of capital outflow. Thus, it alters the private sector expectations about the future monetary policy, which in itself can be inflation reducing. Figure 1 shows the main idea of the paper by plotting average rate of inflation in the last two decades (measured on a logarithmic scale) and the average capital account openness for 163 countries. 1 Figure 1 shows a strong negative relationship between capital account openness and inflation.
The primary channel through which capital account openness affects inflation is through its impact on the elasticity of demand for money. Bartolini and Drazen (1997) argue that by opening up the capital account and providing easier access to foreign assets, governments increase the elasticity of demand for money. As a result, capital account liberalization directly raises the penalty for loose monetary policy in the form of capital outflow. This reduces the temptation to print excess money and lowers the time consistent inflation rate. Moreover, by signalling that it is willing to raise the penalties for loose monetary policy, the policymaker alters the private sector expectations regarding future monetary policy, which in itself can be inflation reducing. 2 Grilli et al. (1991) find that countries with less independent central banks resort to capital controls. In these countries, the governments, by controlling the monetary policy directly, can impose a higher levy, when capital controls are in place. Using empirical methods, the paper finds a negative relationship between central bank independence and inflation. These two conclusions together imply that capital controls are associated with higher inflation rates. In another study, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) look at a panel of 61 developing and developed countries. They conclude that restrictions on capital account transactions tend to be associated with higher inflation, a higher share of seignorage revenue in total revenue, and lower real interest rates. Razin and Yuen (1995) show that the slope of the Phillips curve (inflation-output trade-off) becomes steeper in the presence of capital controls. This is due to a lower semi-elasticity of demand for money, and the absence of any real exchange rate effect on aggregate demand because of a zero trade balance restriction under capital controls. Thus, the policymaker of a closed economy has to generate a higher inflationary shock to reduce unemployment by a given amount. Gruben and McLeod (2002) use cross-section data to investigate the relationship between capital account openness and inflation and conclude that capital account openness appears to lower inflation by disciplining monetary authorities. They also point out that sustained removal of even one capital or current account restriction can reduce average annual inflation by as much as 3%. In another study, Tytell and Wei (2004) study the 'discipline effect' of financial openness on national policies. They find that financial globalization induces countries to pursue lower inflation rates but does not succeed in lowering the budget deficit.
However, the strongest advocates of capital account liberalization recognize that liberalization can expose the vulnerabilities of a weak domestic financial system. To the extent that capital account liberalization places pressures on weak domestic banks, and to the extent that adequate prudential supervision is absent, liberalization can encourage individually rational but socially harmful activities such as excessive risktaking and 'gambling for redemption', which can culminate in full-blown and costly banking crises. As a result, any benefits of capital account liberalization may easily be obscured by the costs of the greater financial fragility it brings, especially in economies with poorly regulated financial sectors. More generally, one might expect the benefits of capital account liberalization to be more pronounced in countries characterized by a sound macroeconomic framework and strong institutions. If this is the case, the lack of strong empirical evidence on the benefits of capital account liberalization may simply be due to the fact that previous research has not considered the role of policies and institutions in intermediating the effects of capital account liberalization on growth or investment.
There have been several studies that have questioned the wisdom of financial openness, especially capital account convertibility. Rodrik (1998) undertook a study covering 100 countries over the period [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] and concluded that there is no evidence that greater capital account convertibility is associated with lower inflation. Rodrik goes on to assert that, in fact, capital inflows undermine central bank's efforts to control inflation.
In another paper, McKinnon and Mathieson (1981) argue for the imposition of capital controls to reduce inflation. They point out that capital controls reduce the opportunities of currency substitution and hence lower the interest elasticity of demand for domestic currency. This in turn reduces the inflation rate that is necessary to generate a given amount of seignorage revenue. It is interesting to note that both Bartolini and Drazen (1997) and McKinnon and Mathieson (1981) use the same argument to reach the opposite conclusion. Both papers agree that a decrease in capital controls will increase the elasticity of demand for money by increasing opportunities of currency substitution. However, while Bartolini and Drazen (1997) argue that this would raise the penalty for loose monetary policy and hence enforce a more disciplined monetary policy, where the incentive to inflate is significantly lowered, McKinnon and Mathieson (1981) argue that it would raise the inflation rate required to generate a specific amount of seignorage revenue. The difference arises primarily because of dissimilar objective functions of the policymaker. While Bartolini and Drazen (1997) assume that the policymaker is interested in pursuing an inflation rate that is consistent with a comfortable balance of payments position, McKinnon and Mathieson (1981) consider a policymaker who is interested in raising a given amount of seignorage revenue.
This paper adds to the existing literature by explicitly considering the fact that the choice of imposing or restricting capital controls may be endogenous. First, inflation levels may influence the policy choice regarding the capital account. One generally expects countries to remove capital controls when inflation is reasonably under control. Thus, one would expect that any empirical results would be biased in the direction of finding a strong positive relationship between open capital account and reasonably low levels of inflation. Secondly, it may be difficult to assess accurately the benefits of capital account liberalization if capital controls are correlated with other fundamental determinants of inflation. Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) find that open capital accounts are more likely to be found in countries with small public sectors and independent central banks. These, however, are factors that may directly impact on inflation, thus making it difficult to isolate the impact of financial liberalization on inflation levels or volatility. This paper also takes into account the fact that inflation has shown a great deal of persistence across a large number of countries. The paper attempts to correct for these econometric issues by employing static as well as dynamic panel data analyses.
An illustrative model
The government is made up of two branches: a fiscal authority and a monetary authority or the central bank. The fiscal authority issues an exogenously determined debt and uses the proceeds to purchase goods and services. The central bank issues currencies by open market operations in domestic and foreign bonds. The central bank is also required to monetize the fiscal debt by printing money and buying it back from the public. In this scenario, the real revenue that the government acquires by issuing newly used money to buy goods and non-money assets is referred to as Seignorage. Thus, the overall government welfare is increasing in the amount of seignorage revenue earned.
On the other hand, the monetization of debt by issuing new money can potentially be inflationary. In most countries hyperinflations stem from the government's need for seignorage revenue. The central bank is concerned about inflation, as inflation has several costs associated with it. It results in loss of reserves in a fixed exchange rate regime and depreciation of the currency in a flexible exchange rate. Higher anticipated inflation reduces the demand for money, which is relatively costless to produce but provides liquidity services at the margin. Higher expected inflation sharpens random income distributions, degrades the allocation signals in relative prices, and raises distortions a non-indexed tax system inflicts on the people. We assume a quadratic cost of the inflation. Thus, the government's welfare function can be written as:
where π is the inflation rate, S(π) the seignorage revenue, and ψ is the weight that the government puts on the costs involved with increasing inflation, such as loss of reserves or depreciation of the currency, vis-à-vis the gains from inflation in terms of seignorage revenue.
The demand for money is denoted by a Cagan money demand function, where nominal interest rates are dominated by nominal inflation. Let the money supply of the country be given by M and the price level be denoted by P. According to the discrete time version of the model, the demand for real money balances M/P is isoelastic and depends entirely on future inflation.
The Cagan model in its log linear stochastic form is given as:
where m ≡ log M, p ≡ log P and η is the semi-elasticity of the demand for real balances with respect to expected inflation. Real money balances depend on expected future inflation and higher expected inflation lowers the demand for real balances by raising the opportunity cost of holding money. Several papers, such as Bartolini and Drazen (1997) , McKinnon and Mathieson (1981) and Gruben and McLeod (2002) (4) where ξ is the degree of capital account liberalization and α is the elasticity of the semi-elasticity of demand for money with respect to capital account liberalization. A value of α greater than unity implies that the semi-elasticity of demand for money is highly elastic with respect to capital account liberalization. In that case, a given increase in capital account liberalization increases the semi-elasticity of demand for money by a greater amount. On the other hand, if α is less than unity then a given increase in capital account liberalization would increase the semi-elasticity of demand for money by a smaller amount. Here, ξ > 0 and α > 0; as a result n (ξ ) > 0. As noted by Cukierman et al. (1992a) , seignorage is the amount of real purchasing power that a government can extract from the public by printing money. A government's real seignorage revenue in period t is given by:
The numerator in equation (5) is the increase in nominal money supply between periods t − 1 and t, while the denominator P t converts this nominal increase into a flow of real resources to the government. However, there are limits to the real resources that the government can obtain by issuing money. The resulting high inflation can lead to a reduction in the real money balances holdings and lead to a reduction of the tax base. As a result, the marginal revenue from printing money can be negative at sufficiently high levels of inflation. Thus, there exists a seignorage maximizing money growth rate. In equilibrium, the rate of inflation is equal to the growth rate of money supply. We assume that money supply grows at a constant rate μ. With this assumption, equation (3) can be rewritten as:
Combining the above equation with equations (4) and (5) yields:
The seignorage revenue maximizing growth rate of money is given by the following first-order condition:
Note that the optimal seignorage revenue maximizing rate of inflation, π S , depends inversely on the capital account liberalization. Liberalizing the capital account leads to lowering of the seignorage revenue maximizing rate of inflation. Using the definition of seignorage given in equation (5), equation (1) can be rewritten as Figure 2 depicts the change in the government's welfare as the inflation rate and the degree of capital account liberalization is changed. We evaluate the government welfare for different combinations of π between 0.05 and 0.5 and ξ between 0.05 and 2. We restrict the numerical analysis to two values of ψ and α -one high and one low. A closed capital account, i.e. ξ close to zero, implies that the government is easily able to raise additional seignorage revenue by generating inflationary shock, as the public has no choice but to hold domestic assets. Consequently, in the case of a low ψ, i.e. Figures 2(a) and 2(c) , when the capital account is relatively closed, the overall welfare is monotonically increasing with inflation as the government puts greater weight on earning seignorage revenue than the loss from higher inflation. However, with the gradual opening up of the capital account it becomes difficult for the government to generate additional seignorage revenue with an inflationary shock, as the public is able to switch away from domestic assets to foreign assets. Thus, with an open capital account, beyond a certain level of inflation, the gain from the additional seignorage revenue is not sufficient enough to offset the loss arising from the government's concern for high inflation, leading to an overall decline in the government's welfare.
On the other hand, in Figures 2(b) and 2(d), even with a closed capital account, the overall government welfare does not increase monotonically with inflation as the government places more weight on reducing inflation than the gains from seignorage revenue. In this case, greater capital account liberalization again makes it difficult to generate seignorage revenue and, at very high levels of inflation and capital account openness, the loss arising from the government's concern for high inflation outweighs the gains from seignorage revenue and the overall welfare becomes negative.
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Finally, the rate at which the government's welfare decreases with capital account liberalization, for a given level of inflation, depends upon the parameter α. The decrease in the welfare is much more prominent at higher rates of inflation. Thus, in countries with high inflation rate, capital account liberalization would reduce more rapidly the incentive for the government to impose inflation tax.
The government solves the following optimality condition to obtain the optimal inflation rate that maximizes its overall welfare:
From the above optimality condition, one obtains a relationship between the optimal inflation and the extent of capital account liberalization. Using the implicit function theorem we get:
Since it is difficult to assign a sign to the above function analytically, we resort to numerical methods. Figure 3 displays the results of the numerical analysis. We again evaluate the sign of the above derivative for different combinations of π and ξ . Across the entire range of π and ξ considered, the derivative has a negative sign. Thus, the optimal inflation is negatively related to the extent of capital account liberalization. Figure 3 . Impact of capital account openness on inflation.
The rate of inflation that maximizes government welfare, π w , falls with opening of the capital account.
Empirical analysis
In this section we use cross-country panel data for 163 countries over the period 1980-2003 to test the prediction of the theory that inflation will be lower in countries that have liberalized their capital account.
Data
We consider the log of average inflation instead of the level of inflation as a few countries in the sample have extremely high average inflation rates. Thus, the parameter estimates from a regression would be determined by a handful of observations. 3 Data on inflation rate, based on GDP deflator, are taken from the World Development Indicators.
We use the Chinn-Ito index, developed in Chinn and Ito (2006) , to measure capital account liberalization. The index is the first principal component of the binary variables pertaining to cross-border financial transactions, based on the IMF's categorical enumeration reported in the Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). This is a compilation of four dichotomous variables accounting for restrictions on capital account transactions, current account transactions, requiring surrendering of export proceeds and the presence of multiple exchange rates. Since these four binary variables account for the degree of control rather than openness, Chinn and Ito flip their values and construct an index based on the standardized principal components. The index ranges from -1.7 to 2.7 and a higher value of the index indicates greater financial openness. We measure financial globalization with a de jure measure instead of a de facto one. We want to study the signalling and discipline effect of capital account liberalization on inflation and a de jure measure is more appropriate.
In addition, we use several other control variables that have been found in the literature as being principal determinants of inflation. The first control variable is a measure of real income per capita, which acts as a measure of the overall development of the economy and captures a wide range of factors that affect average inflation. Owing to the large variation in this variable across the sample of countries, the log of real per capita GDP instead of level is used. Countries with high fiscal deficit are also associated with high inflation. This can be due to two reasons. First, if large fiscal deficit is associated with increased government spending, it will increase aggregate demand and result in higher inflation. Second, if the government is financing its spending by borrowing from the public, inflation will reduce the burden of debt and redistribute wealth towards the government. While data on per capita GDP have been obtained from World Development Indicators, data on the budget deficit have been taken from Government Finance Statistics.
Several other factors have been known to influence the level of inflation in a country. Primary among them is the level of independence that the central bank enjoys. Intuitively, a less independent central bank is associated with a higher rate of inflation. Central bank independence refers to the obligations of the central bank regarding financing the budget deficit through money creation and/or interest rate manipulation. The freer the central bank is from this point of view, the lower is the inflation rate. A less free central bank will be forced to introduce inflationary shocks to generate seignorage revenue to finance the budget deficit. Moreover, a less free central bank is unable to pre-commit to its policy choices, which results in higher inflation. Cukierman et al. (1992b) empirically show that inflation is higher in countries with low central bank independence. De facto central bank independence is controlled using the turnover rate of the central bank governor from Ghosh et al. (2003) . A high turnover of the governor implies a low independence from the government and should be associated with higher inflation rates. The index ranges from 0 to 1.4, with countries such as Bolivia and Costa Rica having the least independent central banks.
The level of inflation is also affected by the extent of political stability that a country enjoys. Cukierman et al. (1992a) show that inflation will be higher in countries that are politically unstable because the policymaker lacks the ability to precommit. We use the political stability index developed by Intra Country Risk Guide. The index is made up of variables such as government stability, socioeconomic conditions, conflicts, law and order etc. The index ranges from 0 to 100 with a higher number indicating a more politically stable regime.
Fixed exchange rates are associated with low inflation as they serve as a nominal anchor for the monetary policy. Fixed exchange rate also imposes a discipline effect, as the political costs of abandoning the peg result in tighter policies. To control for exchange rate regimes, we use the exchange rate index formulated by Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) , which is based on market determined exchange rates rather than official exchange rates. The index ranges from 1 to 15 with a higher number implying a more flexible exchange rate regime.
The final control variable is trade openness. Trade openness is calculated as the share of imports in GDP. Romer (1993) shows that there exists a significant negative relationship between trade openness and inflation. Generally, inflation leads to real exchange rate depreciation and the harms of depreciation are greater in more open economies. As a result, the government has lower incentive in open economies to introduce surprise inflationary shock. Data on trade openness have been obtained from World Development Indicators. Finally, we include a dummy variable for the Latin American countries as countries in this region have behaved very differently compared with other regions.
Econometric analysis
The empirical model is given by following equation,
where i refers to the country and t represents the time period. Here, Y is the dependent variable, measured as log of inflation. Among the explanatory variable, X 1 is the main variable of interest, i.e. capital account liberalization, X 2 is log of per capita GDP, X 3 is the budget deficit as a percentage of GDP, X 4 is a measure of exchange rate regime, X 5 is the degree of political stability, X 6 is a measure of central bank dependence and X 7 is a measure of trade openness. A large econometric literature, including Nelson and Plosser (1982) , Fuhrer and Moore (1995) and Pivetta and Reis (2007) , has found that post-war inflation in US and other industrial countries exhibits high persistence. Other works, such as Baum et al. (1999) and Francisco and Bleaney (2005) have looked at developing countries and have found evidence for persistent inflation.
In our sample of 163 countries, a Wooldridge test for autocorrelation suggests the presence of first-order serial correlation. In the presence of autocorrelation, the error term in equation (12) can be written as:
In the literature, there are several ways to estimate the model in the presence of serial correlation. One can use a feasible GLS with AR1 correlation. However, this procedure has been criticized for underestimating the standard errors. The panel-corrected standard error estimates, which use Prais-Winstein regression, address this problem. The estimates assume that the disturbances are heteroscedastic and contemporaneously correlated across panels. The panel-corrected standard error estimates allow for first-order correlation, AR(l), with a common coefficient of the AR(l) process across all the panels (ρ i = ρ, ∀i), as well as a specific coefficient of the AR(1) process for each panel (ρ i = ρ j , ∀ i = j).
When autocorrelation with a common coefficient of correlation is specified, the common correlation coefficient is computed as:
where ρ i is the autocorrelation coefficient for country i and m is the number of countries. Table 1 displays the results of the Prais-Winstein regression with a common autocorrelation coefficient, while Table 2 considers the case of panel specific coefficients. All the specifications have a dummy variable for Latin American countries, which has not been reported. The results are broadly similar.
The data support the prediction of the theoretical model. Capital account openness is highly significant across all specifications thereby implying a statistically significant negative relationship between capital account openness and inflation. The coefficients on per capita GDP across different specifications suggest that higher real per capita income is significantly associated with a lower level of inflation. We find that central government budget deficit is not a significant predictor of inflation. On the other hand, the exchange rate regimes show up as a very strong and significant predictor of inflation across all specifications.
Central bank dependence shows up with the expected positive sign indicating that countries with highly dependent central bank are characterized by higher inflation. The results also show that countries that are politically stable are associated with lower inflation. However, when we control for central bank dependence as well as political stability, only central bank dependence shows up as a significant predictor. Finally, we find that there is a small but significant negative relationship between trade openness and inflation, if it is assumed that the countries are characterized by different degrees of persistence.
Another way to explain the persistence in inflation is by introducing a lagged value of the variable on the right-hand side. 4 With the presence of a lagged dependent variable, complications arise in the estimation of the model using least square methods. In this case, the lagged dependent variable tends to be correlated with the error term. Arellano and Bond (1991) develop a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator that solves this problem. First differencing equation (12) removes the v i and produces an Robust t statistics in parentheses. * * * indicates significant at 1%, * * indicates significant at 5% and * indicates significant at 10%. 
where is the first-difference operator. The Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data estimator uses lagged levels of the dependent variable and the predetermined variables and the differences of the strictly exogenous variables as instruments. A variable x it is said to be strictly exogenous if E[x it ε is ] = 0 for all t and s.
the variable is said to be endogenous. Intuitively, if the error term at time t has some feedback on the subsequent realizations of x it , then x it is an endogenous variable. As pointed out earlier, the choice of imposing capital controls may be endogenous. Inflation levels influence the policy choice regarding the capital account. One generally expects countries to remove capital controls when inflation is reasonably under control. The unforecastable errors today might affect future changes in capital account liberalization and hence this variable is not strictly exogenous but endogenous. Its two-period lagged values are used as instruments.
Another possible endogenous variable is the exchange rate regime. Generally, higher inflation can trigger a switch in an exchange rate regime. The regime switch can take place in both directions. Higher inflation makes a peg less convenient. Either the peg has to be adjusted very frequently or there is great deal of fluctuation in the real exchange rate. Higher inflation can also make a departure from a float more likely. Countries with severe inflationary problems frequently adopt a peg as a highly visible nominal anchor in a stabilization attempt. Thus, in the subsequent analysis, capital account liberalization and exchange rate are treated as endogenous variables.
The estimation results of the model described above using the method of difference-GMM are shown in Table 3 . The dependent variable is the first difference ( ) of log of inflation and the explanatory variables are in first difference as well. The results reported in Table 3 show that even after accounting for the observed persistence in inflation and endogeneity of capital account liberalization and exchange rate regimes, the hypothesis that opening up the capital account leads to lower inflation holds and the effects are significant and sizeable across all specifications. An increase in capital account openness index of 0.1 unit decreases the inflation rate by as much as 2.9%. Thus, if the inflation is at its sample mean of 58.15%, opening up of the capital account will reduce it by 1.68% to 56.46%.
Among other explanatory variables, per capita GDP, exchange rate regimes and central bank dependence continue to have a significant impact on inflation in the expected direction. However, trade openness and political stability no longer affect inflation in a significant way. Finally, as before, budget deficit has no impact on inflation.
Next, we divide the entire sample of countries on the basis of inflation, income and indebtedness. From Table 4 , we find that the negative relationship between capital account openness and inflation is four times stronger in high inflation countries than low inflation countries, and twice as strong as the entire sample. Columns (III) and (IV) of Table 4 indicate that the coefficient for high income countries is not statistically significant while that for low income countries is highly significant. Thus, the overall negative relationship between opening of a capital account and inflation is primarily driven by low-income countries.
Finally, columns (V) and (VI) show that the negative relationship is also significantly strong for highly indebted countries. A country that is faced with an external debt Robust t statistics in parenthesis. * * * indicates significant at 1%, * * indicates significant at 5% and * indicates significant at 10%.
Capital account liberalization and exchange rate regimes are treated as endogenous variables.
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A. Sen Gupta can raise the resources to pay the debt either externally or internally. It can raise the resources externally in two different ways. It could undertake a devaluation, which would make its exports more competitive and generate a trade surplus. Alternatively, it could open up the capital account by removing capital controls on foreign investment. This will pave the way for a more efficient allocation of savings and increase the country's attractiveness to foreign investors. The resulting higher growth rate and accumulation of reserves will provide the economy with resources to service the debt. However, if the economy is closed then the government will have to raise the resources internally. This implies that resources will have to be transferred from the private sector to the government. If inflation tax is the major mechanism for this transfer then it will result in higher inflation.
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between capital account openness and inflation. Using the Cagan money demand relationship, we build a theoretical model that predicts that opening up the capital account will lower inflation. Thereafter, using both dynamic and static panel data estimators, on a sample covering 163 countries analysed in the period from 1980 to 2003, we find that a higher degree of capital account openness generates lower inflation rates. A subsample analysis indicates that the overall negative relationship is primarily driven by high inflation, low income and highly indebted countries. The spate of financial crises in Latin America and Asia in the last two decades has led many to question the benefits of capital account liberalization. Rodrik (1998) succinctly sums up the sceptics' view: 'Enshrining capital account convertibility in the IMF's articles of agreement is an idea whose time has not yet come. We have no evidence it will solve any of our problems, and some reason to think it will make them worse.' Despite these warnings, the last two decades witnessed a concerted effort towards capital account liberalization. This paper tries to identify one potentially important benefit of such liberalization. Capital account openness appears to discipline monetary authorities, or to help them convince the private sector that they will be more disciplined in the future.
